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INTRODUCTION 
I told the Shah that if the Army budget were increased we could do little if anything for 
agriculture, education or public health. He said, "Very well, then; we'll have to postpone those 
things." 
This incident occurred in 1943, a year after the Shah had succeeded his father and 
was recounted by A. C. Millspaugh (1946:17), then financial advisor to the 
Iranian government. 
By the 1970s, however, the Iranian government was denying the relevance of 
the "guns versus butter" tradeoff for the country. The Shah posed the problem 
differently, "What is the use of having an advanced industry in a country which 
could be brought to its knees when face~ with any small event? Asked on a 
subsequent occasion whether the desire for maximum national power implicit in 
such defense expenditure was compatible with the efforts to achieve maximum 
economic development, he replied, "It is not only compatible but essential. The 
one is worthless without the other. There is no economic power without military 
power."(t) 
On the other. hand, defense expenditures in particular have been cited by 
several observers<2) as having had a detrimental impact on the country's 
economy, thus, in part contributing to internal tensions that ultimately resulted 
in the revolution. 
The existing literature on this period in Iran's history is, unfortunately, largely 
anecdotal, with little or no attempt to empirically determine the links between 
military expenditure and various economic performance indices. Furthermore, 
from a theoretical point of view, a logical case cc\1.ild be made either way that the 
likely net impact of military expenditures was negative or positive. <3) 
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Classical economic theory, for example, would predict on the basis of 
resource allocation, that defense will decrease investment or civilian consumption 
and thus reduce growth or welfare. The military burden would have to be 
justified on the basis of other social welfare gains such as an increase in collective 
security. Keynesian theory, on the other hand, could claim that in the presence of 
inadequate effective demand the operation of the multiplier would imply an 
increase in national product resulting from additional defense expenditure; thus 
there could be some economic justification for military spending. If the economy 
operates with substantial excess capacity, then additional demand and output 
would raise capacity utilization, thereby increasing the rate of profit and possibly 
accelerating investment. Whether in the short and long run the former or latter 
effect dominates will determine the final outcome of defense on the country's 
economic performance (Deger and Smith, 1985:49). Clearly, the impacts of 
military expenditure will also vary from sector to sector. The sections that follow 
attempt to throw some light on this interesting and controversial topic through 
quantifying the impact of Iran's defense expenditures on the main sectors of 
economic activity. 
SCOPE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
Iran's defense expenditures exhibited marked differences before and after the 
1973-74 oil price increases, with military purchases rising from $5. 9 million in FY 
1972 to $5. 8 billion in FY 1977. <4) A large portion of this expenditure was on 
weapons acquisitions from the United States. (S), 
In 1963-73, Iran's defense expenditures averaged an annual growth rate of22. 7 
percent and comprised an average 10.6 percent of its GNP. Yet this was not more 
than the average percentage of GNP devoted to military expenditures by 
countries in the Middle East (10. 7 percent}. In fact, ·Iran spent less on military 
expenditures than Iraq (14.2 percent}, Israel (32 percent), Jordan (14.2 percent}, 
Saudi Arabia (15 percent), Syria (15. 7 percent} and Egypt (22.8 percent). 
Although Iran's post-1973-74 defense spending accelerated and consumed 29.4 
percent of the government budget in 1975-76 and around 27 percent in 1976-77, 
allocations to the domestic programs were more than double that amount 
(ACDA, 1974). 
Budget presentations (Table 1) were always in terms of broad areas of 
disbursement i.e., there were no .. references to construction of military 
industries. Careful scrutiny of the budgets ofl:his period reveal~ for example that 
under the heading of public affairs in 1976; $1.7 billion was allocated for 
government buildings and construction - a 66 p~rcent increase. over the previous· 
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year. (6) Most of this was for fixed capital investments with about 70 percent of 
the $1. 7 billion for military construction activity - new air and naval bases, 
expansion \of army buildings, plus housing and related infrastructure. The Military 
Industries Organization received $106 million for expansion of the electronics 
industries, vehicle assembly, and son on. Thus the final total military expenditure 
was around $9.5 billion in 1977. All in all, indirect and hidden military 
expenditures may have raised allocations in this area to between 15 and 18 percent 
of GDP. 
Table 1 - Iran: Defense Expenditures 
(under defense allocation in 
















Note: Exchange rates 1974/75, $ = 67.50 rials; 















Another cost that is hidden in the budget is the salaries for foreign technicians. 
Because the country's arms purchases were largely for extremely advanced 
weapons, a requirement was simultaneously generated for many thousands of 
skilled technicians to maintain, repair, support and operate the equipment. For 
example, fifteen skilled technicians were needed to keep one F-14 aircraft in 
combat-ready condition - and Iran ordered eighty of these planes. Other 
specialists were needed to perform crucial logistics, communications and 
intelligence functions. Normally, this involved contracting with U.S. arms firms 
to perform backup services on the equipment they sold to Iranian forces. Thus, 
Grumman deployed some 1,000 U.S. technicians to Iran to maintain the eighty 
F-14s (Albrecht, 1979: 157-179). 
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Not only did the Shah order vast quantities of America's most advanced 
weapons, he was also acquiring capability to produce them in Iran. Under a 
multibillion dollar industrialization program, the Shah commissioned U.S. arms 
firms to build entire weapons factories from scratch in Iran. Bell Helicopter was 
building a factory to produce Model-214 helicopters in Isfahan, and Hughes was 
building a missile plant in Shiraz. These and several other ventures (Race and 
Class, 1979: %) represented a large share of U.S. industrial involvement in Iran 
and were key links in the Shah's efforts to develop modern high technology 
industries.(?) 
Concentration on numbers of dollars spent, however, tends to obscure other 
elements in the picture. The amounts quoted involve weapons on order· - ·large 
one-time purchases with high capital costs, which realistically should be spread 
over a number of years. Up to 50 percent of the dollar figures quoted in these 
purchases involved software, e.g., building airfields and communications 
networks, training engineers, maintenance technicians, electronic experts and air 
traffic controllers; and staffing language schools. They also include the cost of 
spare parts, handling crating, test and evaluation services, as well as assistance in 
manpower planning and logistical services. In many cases, they also involved 
basic infrastructural additions - airfields, ports, harbors - which have significant 
visible benefits for the civilian sector of the economy, not to mention the less 
quantifiable technology transfer spinoffs of technical training programs and the 
like (Chubin; 1978: 267). 
CROSS SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE 
EXPENDITURES 
Did Iran's military build-up especially after 1973 have an adverse affect on 
growth? While common sense would seem to point in that direction, recent 
research has indicated that growth in developing countries is not necessarily 
harmed by defense expenditures. As noted, a number of studies have found a 
positive relationship between defense expenditures and growth (Looney and 
Frederiksen, 1986; Looney, 1986; Frederiksen and Looney, 1985 a; Frederiksen 
and Looney, 1985 b; see also Ball, 1985 for an alternative interpretation). In a 
statistical examination of forty-four countries and using data for the 1950-65 
period, Benoit (1973: xix) concluded that: 
The big surprise of this study was the finding that the evidence does not 
indicate that defense has had any net adverse effect on growth in developing 
countries... • 
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The crucial evidence in this matter was the finding that the average 1950-65 
defense burdens (defense as a percent of national product) of 44 developing 
countries were positively not inversely correlated with their growth rates over 
comp:uable time periods: i.e., the more they spent on defense, in relation to 
the size of their economies, the faster they grew - and vice versa. This basic 
correlation was strong enough so that there was less than one chance in a 
thousand that it could have occurred by accident. (B) · 
However, when investment as a percent of GDP and bilateral aid receipts as a 
percent of'GNP were included in the regression equation, the contribution of 
defense, though still positive in sign, was no longer statistically significant. 
It may well be that these inconclusive results simply stem from the fact that 
the usual perception of the role of defense expenditures is through their direct 
impact; i.e., the guns versus butter analogy. If on the other hand, we view 
developing countries like Iran largely as disequilibrium systems, then it is more 
logical to argue that the actual environment in which defense expenditures take 
place will determine whether their ultimate impact on the economy is positive. 
For example, the prime determinant in the relationship between growth and 
defense spending could simply be the overall financial resource constraint faced 
by the individual country and the manner in which authorities respond to that 
constraint;; i.e., a country that is resource constrained (faces some combination of 
lagging taxes, reduced private and government savings, reduced borrowing power 
overseas, or export shortfalls), and hence faces a reduction of its public sector 
budget, will probably sacrifice expenditures on high growth development 
programs to maintain defense expenditures. 
This is likely for two reasons. First, governments usually find it more 
expedient for political reasons to curtail capital investments (new infrastructure 
programs, for example) rather than expenditures on the current account. Second, 
given that a defense establishment exists, several interest groups often find it 
economically advantageous to maintain the status quo. These groups might 
include high ranking officers, military contractors, and certain politicians. More 
often than not, military expenditures have been frozen while highly productive 
development programs were forced to bear the brunt of the deflationary policies 
(Barnaby, 1978: 23). In short, defense expenditures are likely to be asymmetric -
difficult to cut back but easily expanded. Thus, a resource constrained country, 
ceteris paribus,1 should show a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between growth and defense spending. 
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The reverse is true for countries that have a relative abundance of financial 
resources; i.e.,have an elastic supply of tax revenues and high inflows of foreign 
exchange (either through balance of payments surpluses or aid). These countries 
are better able to afford the growth-oriented capital expenditure programs 
concomitant with maintaining, or even increasing, defense programs. 
More formally, one would expect a negative relationship to exist between 
defense expenditures and economic growth in those developing countries which 
are predominantly characterized by: 
(1) A high population growth requiring increased amounts of public services; 
(2) Migration toward cities due to rising aspirations; 
(3) A public administration which is of limited efficiency, especially in the 
collection of taxes and a tax system which is inflexible in generating 
revenue and is regressive; 
(4) Exports that are limited in number and are comprised largely of products 
whose markets are expanding relatively slowly (as a result, there is 
inelasticity and instability in the country's external purchasing power); 
(5) Shortages of government revenue which create bottlenecks in the supply 
of social overhead capital and skilled labor; 
(6) Little or no capacity for the home production of manufactured products, 
especially engineering products (thus, manufactures amount to a signifi-
cant proportion of imports); 
(7) A capital market which is imperfectly competitive (so that overall savings 
rates are low); 
(8) Chronic balance of payments difficulties due to (4) and (6) above, with the 
result of direct import controls (such controls on imports imply reducing 
imports to the size of export receipts which, in tum, creates shortages, 
bottlenecks, and reduced growth); 
(9) An urban-industrial society which needs substantially more infrastructure 
than previously due to urbanization and industrialization; 
(10) Lagging revenues which often result in substantial delays fn the provision 
of government services, severely prejudicing the growth of the industrial 
sector; 
(11) High urbanization rates requiring more government attention to the 
construction of low income housing, urban transportation, etc. (these 
investments have a high capital output ratio); 
(12) Lagging government investment in social infrastructure which severely 
increases social tensions in the cities and hampers the smooth growth of 
industry; 
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(13) A large external debt which has been built up as a result of past 
government deficits and balance of payments deficits (additional 
borrowing becoming increasingly difficult, thus reducing the size of the 
current account deficit); 
(14) A defense establishment which has developed political influence and is 
capable of preventing cutbacks in military expenditures during budg-
etary crises; 
(15) An industrial structure characterized by relatively few linkages between 
defense expenditures and the rest of the economy; 
(16) A relatively small export sector, which when combined with (3), (5), 
(6), (8), (10), (12) and (15) means a reduced internal capacity to 
transform; 
(17) Increased external and internal tension, forcing an increasing proportion 
of government expenditures to defense; 
(18) Reduced aid flows stemming from political and economic frictions with 
its donor countries; 
(19) A high population growth, increasing credit facilities, and a growing 
aspiration of the population which reduces the savings rate. (9) 
It is quite possible that growth can be constrained if only several of the more 
critical factors are present. For example, defense expenditures could conceivably 
limit growth if they reduced the country's ability to change its productive 
structure to meet the changing patterns of internal and external demand. 
Although this problem is not likely to be quite as serious in a slowly developing 
economy, rapid growth requires large increases in the supplies of machinery and 
equipment, raw materials, and other manufactured goods that are typically 
imported by developing countries. The more rapid the rate of growth, the larger 
the reallocation oflabor and capital away from traditional patterns will have to be 
to prevent bottlenecks. If this reallocation is not sufficiently swift, shortages of 
imported goods will provide a further limit to growth quite apart from the 
investment limitation. This import limit reflects the inability of the economy to 
provide the composition of output from domestic sources plus imports - that is, 
that which is required by its level of income, rate of investment and pattern of 
domestic demand (Chenery, 1971). In cases of acute shortages of imported 
goods, the economy will be unable to transform potential savings into 
investment because ofinsufficient supplies ofinvestment goods. The case oflndia 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s is often cited where as much as 50 percent of its 
defense programs occurred directly at the expense of civilian investment 
allocation (Dagli, 1969). 
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EMPIRICAL RES UL TS 
A number of conceivable proxy indicators for the availability of financial 
resources could be used to test the resource constant hypothesis. The selection of 
variables was based largely on the availability and comparability of data between 
countries. The main source of data was the World Bank (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1978). Nine variables were selected to 
import availability.<1°l A priori each should have an effect on the defense 
burden-growth relationship as shown in Table 3. 
As an initial step, a cluster analysis. (t t) was performed with the above nine 
variables for 37 of Benoit's original sample of 44 countries. <12l Four groups were 
identified (Table 2). The first group, of which Iran was a member (Group I, n = 
24), was characterized by a high growth in foreign exchange earnings, a high 
import elasticity, a low debt-servicing ratio, a low incremental capital output 
ratio, a high current account deficit/GDP ratio, and a low ratio of civilian 
expenditures to government revenues. 
The second group of countries (Group II, n = 9) was quite the opposite. These 
countries were characterized by a low growth in foreign exchange earnings, a 
high debt service ratio, a low current account deficit as a percent ofGDP, a high 
percent of government• revenues spent on civilian consumption, and a low import 
elasticity. A thitd group of countries (Group III: Iraq, Burma, Syria) seem to fall 
between Groups I and II. As Table 6 indicates, the means of some variables are 
higher than for Groups I and II, while th~ means of other variables are either 
lower or in between the means for Groups I and II. Group IV consisted of just 
Vietnam which has a number of extreme values and can clearly be considered a 
special case. 
Sharp differences also exist between the two largest groups (Groups I and II) 
for a number of other macroeconomic variables (Table 3). Overall, Groups I and 
II differed significantly and consistently on· the basis of a wide variety of 
macroeconomic indicators indicative of resource availabilities and constraints. To 
confirm the placement of our sample of countries into Groups I and II, a 
discriminant analysis was performed to determine the probability of correct 
grouping. The placement of the countries from the cluster analysis was used as 
the basis for the initial classification. All countries were correctly classified at the 
100 percent probability level, except the Dominican Republic which had a 
probability of 88 percent of correct placement. 
Table 2 - A Comparison of Means Between Groups 
Cluster Analysis Variables 
---






GROUP I 56.5 9.5 20.7 68.0 2.2 67.3 1.5 -4.8 7.9 
II 85.2 6.4 23.5 69.4 2.3 38.1 0.0 0.1 3.8 
III 84.8 4.7. 14.6 73.3 3.5 85.2 0.9 -1.2 11.0 





GROUP I 66.8 354.6 7.6 19.0 73.3 2.0 72.5 1.3 -3.7 7.2 
II 62.8 857.5 7.5 20.2 62.4 3.8 67.5 1.3 -2.7 10.1 
III 55.6 3010.0 12.2 24.4 59.1 2.4 78.0 1.3 -14.0 22.5 





Table 3 - Other Macroeconomic Indicaton 
Average Annual Growth 
Country 
GDP DEF CIVGDP IMP INV 
GROUP I 
Malaysia 4.99 7.95 5.00 3.6 9.2 
Nigeria 4.21 10.51 3.75 8.0 12.1 
Greece 6.21 -0.33 6.58 9.5 7.8 
Spain 6.10 2.72 6.20 13.2 16.5 
Guatemala 4.73 4.62 4.73 5.6 11.2 
El Salvador 4.95 6.37 4.95 6.2 9.6 
Honduras 3.75 3.21 3.75 8.0 10.2 
China (Taiwan) 8.76 16.50 8.12 18.6 14.0 
Thailand 5.86 6.56 5.85 11.2 15.9 
Venezuela 6.64 9.13 6.65 6.4 10.2 
S.Africa 4.84 12.11 4.77 7.2 12.5 
S. Korea 5.66 -2.50 6.23 20.9 17.1 
Iran 4.73 14.85 4.51 14.4 7.8 
Yugoslavia "· 8.09 -0.47 8.68 10.4 8.0 
Dominican Rep. 4.07 -5.50 4.28 9.7 12.0 
Ecuador 4.63 9.60 4.81 8.7 1.8 
Egypt I I 6.46 10.87 6.17 6.1 14.9 Costa Rica 4.85 15.34 4.85 10.0 11.6 
Tunisia I 5.52 -2.59 5.68 6.4 13.5 Israel 10.70 11.66 10.47 11.2 10.6 Jordan 9.01 8.5 10.70 5.3 10.0 
Colombia 4.53 7.21 4.50 5.4 1.3 
Chile 3.50 -1.21 3.63 5.7 5.2 
Turkey 5.74 6.24 5.72 7.2 10.2 
MEAN 5.77 6.29 5.86 9.1 10.6 
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Table 3 - Cont'd: Other Macroeconomic Indicators 
Country 
Average Annual Growth 




India 3.38 2.46 3.20 1.0 6.2 
Mexico 6.13 3.24 6.15 5.9 6.4 
Brazil 5.35 5.97 5.16 9.3 2.9 
Argentina 3.24 -1.10 3.37 2.2 0.6 
Sudan 5.00 13.4 4.92 1.6 3.4 
Peru 5.24 3.35 5.25 7.8 5.8 
Philippines 5.10 3.73 5.12 4.5 9.9 
Morocco 2.43 12.77 2.20 4.4 6.9 
Tanzania 3.08 32.00 2.90 6.5 5.7 
MEAN 4.33 7.08 4.25 4.8 5.3 
GROUP III 
Iraq 6.75 14.91 6.39 4.2 1.2 
Syria 5.50 9.86 4.97 7.1 3.1 
Burma 5.10 8.39 4.93 -5.6 9.8 
MEAN 5.78 11.05 5.43 1.9 4.7 
GROUP IV 
Vietnam 5.34 26.5 3.00 15.6 7.2 
OVERALL MEAN 5.41 6.77 5.36 7.7 8.7 
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Table 3 - Cont'd: Other Macroeconomic Indicaton 
PUBSA V GOVSA V AID DEFN INVEST 
Country (%GDP) (% REV) (% GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) 
GROUP I 
Malaysia 20.1 6.8 0.46 2.68 14.47 
Nigeria 30.4 20.2 1.86 0.56 11.93 
Greece 14.3 8.7 3.27 5.21 20.68 
Spain 34.6 29.6 0.89 3.26 20.03 
Guatemala 17.1 22.7 0.89 0.89 11.01 
El Salvador 13.2 23.4 0.71 1.41 12.58 
Honduras 8.8 13.4 0.04 1.24 14.33 
China (Taiwan) 22.0 -4.6 5.23 11.42 17.96 
Thailand 11.7 23.3 0.91 3.38 17.37 
Venezuela 33.9 33.4 ..0.35 1.88 23.96 
S. Africa 26.7 20.1 ..0.17 1.23 20.03 
S. Korea 18.9 10.8 7.88 5.32 13.17 
Iran 47.8 32.1 1.07 4.00 15.25 
Yugoslavia: 71.3 11.5 0.60 8.76 35.85 
Dominican Rep. 17.4 -19.3 2.87 4.23 14.49 
Ecuador 16.9 7.8 0.34 2.11 14.10 
Egypt -8.2 -33.8 2.97 6.90 16.60 
Costa Rica 8.3 6.5 1.96 0.32 18.08 
Tunisia 14.6 16.8 10.22 1.78 21.10 
Israel -15.3 -4.7 9.97 6.08 29.51 
Jordan -55.3 -33.7 24.70 16.75 14.97 
Colombia 22.8 30.0 0.04 1.59 18.04 
Chile -4.4. 16.9 0.83 2.69 10.80 
Turkey 34.5 22.9 2.15 4.38 13.22 
MEAN 16.8 10.9 3.31 4.09 17.48 
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Table 3 - Concl'd: Other Macroeconomic Indicators 
PUBSA V GOVSA V AID DEFN INVEST 
Country (% GDP) (% GDP) (% ·GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) 
GROUP II 
India 13.4 7.6 1.22 2.46 12.32 
Mexico 13.5 0.5 0.12 0.75 17.25 
Brazil 12.1 4.3 0.53 2.63 16.43 
Argentina -0.1 -0.7 0.01 2.49 19.47 
Sudan -23.6 3.2 2.10 1.59 12.38 
Peru 3.0 -1.9 0.21 2.70 22.39 
Philippines 5.8 -10.3 1.34 1.59 11.11 
Morocco 11.0 -3.1 2.54 3.84 12.88 
Tanzania 2.6 7.4 -5.53 2.11 12.20 
MEAN 4.2 0.8 0.28 2.24 15.16 
GROUP III 
Iraq 45.4 16.0 1.28 5.93 16.45 
Syria -18.5 -14.0 1.85 7.04 16.95 
Burma 15.5 42.5 1.34 6.61 18.06 
MEAN 14.1 14.8 1.49 6.53 17.15 
GROUP IV 
Vietnam -61.5 -151.2 14.34 10.20 10.33 
OVERALL MEAN 11.4 4.4 2.72 4.55 16.70 
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As a next step using Benoit's methodology and both his data and time frame 
(1950-1965), linear regression equations were estimated for Groups I and II with 
civilian economic growth (CIVGDP) as the dependent variable, and investment 
as a percent of GDP {INVEST), receipts of bilateral aid as a percent of GDP 
(AID}, and the average annual defense expenditure as a percent of GDP (DEFN) 
as the independent variables. The estimated equations for both groups are as 
follows {"t" values appear in parentheses):. 
Group I: 





(2) CIVGDP = 4.72 + 0.15 INVEST + 0.19 AID+ 1.22 DEFN 
r2=0.89 
(1. 92) (1.46) (-3.52) r2=0. 76 
The most striking result and one which supports the resource constraint 
hypothesis is that for Group II - the resource abundant group of which Iran was 
member - the coefficient of DEFN is positive and statistically significant at the 
99 percent level of confidence. On the other hand, the coefficient of DEFN for 
Group II - the resource constrained group - is negative and also statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level. Furthermore, there is a sharp difference 
between these results and those obtained by Benoit (1978: 274) which were: 
(3) CIVGDP = 1.14 + 0.21 INVEST + 0.13 AID + 0.11 DEFN 
(5.57) (2.30) (1.34) r 2=0.61 
The coefficient for DEFN in equation (3) is not statistically significant, and the 
r2 value is lower than those obtained in equations (1) and (2). 
The linear equation was also estimated for Group I excluding the Dominican 
Republic due to its relatively low probability of correct classification. For this 
group (Group IA, n = 23), the estimated equation is: 
Group IA: 
(4) CIVGDP = 1.89 + 0.15 INVEST+ 0.12 AID+ 0.23 DEFN 
(6.12) (3.11) (4.03) r2=0.90 
• 
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As expected, the r2 value is slightly higher as is the t value for the DEFN 
coefficient. These results imply that in relatively non-resource constrained 
countries, either defense expenditures contribute to growth directly or, more 
likely, that these countries are able to maintain development programs which 
contribute to growth while maintaining defense programs. On the other hand, in 
resource constrained countries, the results imply that defense expendituresdo not 
contribute to growth or, more likely, that defense expenditures continue at the 
expense of the highly productive development programs which hinders 
economic growth. 
By grouping on the basis of, for example, military regimes (which fall into 
both of our groups), it is understandable why previous attempts have failed to 
identify any consistent relationship between defense and growth. One might 
argue, however, appropriate classification is the level of economic development. 
As a test of this proposition, per capita income (PER CAP) was added as a tenth 
variable to the cluster analysis. This procedure resulted in a very different set of 
countries in the two larger groups. Using the same regression variables as above, 
the estimated equations for the two large groups are: 
High Income Group: 
(5) CIVGDP = 1.6 + 0.17 INVEST + 0.32 AID + 0.10 DEFN 
(3.1) (2. 7) (0. 7) r2=0. 82 
Low Income Group:. 
(6) CIVGDP = 1.4 + 0.17 INVEST+ 0.09 AID+ 0.17 DEFN 
(2.1) (1.3) (1.7) r2=0.54 
As can be seen, the coefficient of DEFN, while positive, is not statistically 
significant in either equation, and the r2 values are lower than for the equations 
reported above. (l3) 
A TEST OF CAUSALITY 
Benoit examined several alternative hypotheses to explain his correlation 
between the growth in defense spending and the growth in the economies. First, 
he doubted whether the correlation could be spurious. Second, he believed that no 
systematic bias existed in the data. Third, Benoit felt that there was little evidence 
to suggest economic growth caused the expansion in defense; i.e., changes in 
burdens occurred at r.andom and were not correlated with increases in 
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government revenues. Indeed, he felt that variations in defense expenditure 
seemed to be best explained by strategic considerations. Benoit's final assertion 
was that defense spending must have some positive effect on government 
growth, coupled with the influence of international economic aid and domestic 
investment, although "The statistical evidence is highlyambiguous - it neither 
lends strong support to our hypothesis nor does it really undermine it. General 
and qualitative considerations derived from our research led us nevertheless, to 
suppose that the hypothesis is likely to be correct (Benoit, 1973: 24). <14>" 
To statistically determine if the relationship was, in fact, from defense 
expenditures to growth rather than vice versa, a two stage estimation procedure 
was employed. A number of independent variables not directly related to growth 
were selected and regressed on defense expenditures. The variables were 
consistent with our theoretical model and included the resources gap (savings 
minus investment) as a percent of gross domestic investment (REGAP), the 
capital inflow (new import of goods and services) as a percent of GDP (INF), 
government expenditure as a percent of GDP (GOVEX), non-tax revenues 
(OR), and government consumption expenditures (GCONS). The estimated 








0.01 OR + 0.04 GCONS . 
(2.4) (1.0) r2=0.64 
0.01 GOVEX + 
(2.0) 
(8) DEFN = -1.25 - 0.28 REGAP - 0.19 INF+ 0.12 GOVEX + 0.03 OR+ 
(0.3) (1.8) (2. 7) (2.1) 
0.18 GCONS 
(1.0) r2=0.84 
Both equations yield relatively high r2 values. Government expenditures 
(GOVEX) are statistically significant for both groups although the signs are 
opposite. These results support our earlier hypothesis: countries in Group I tend 
to spend additional funds on non-defense items,. while the opposite is true for 
countries in Group II. 
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Using the estimated values for defense expenditures from the above equations 
(DEFN1), regression equations were reestimated with CIVGDP as the dependent 
variable. The results were as follows: 
Group I: 
(9) CIVGDP = 1.45 + 0.07 INVEST + 0.14 AID + 0.22 DEFN1 
(5.8) (2.6) (2.3) r2=0.83 
Group II: 
(10) CIVGDP = 4.07 + 0.20 INVEST + 0.08 AID + 1.30 DEFN1 
(2.3) (0.6) (3.0) r2=0.69 
These results tentatively confirm the Benoit thesis on the direction of 
causality, and do not, other than slightly lower t values, deviate from the original 
least squares estimates. 
·, : ..: 
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
While the above analysis appears to suggest that the relationship between 
military expenditure and economic growth may have been complementary over 
the 1950-65 period, cross section analysis by itself cannot conclusively prove this 
linkage. 
For one thing, results based on cross sectional designs are somewhat limited in 
their ability to confirm causal relationships. To tackle questions such as the 
impact of military spending on economic performance, we need dynamic 
analysis to determine: 
(1) The nature and time phasing of the impacts on the economy associated 
with military expenditures, and 
(2) Any posssible over time changes in the parameters of this relationship. 
It is hypothesized that over time military expenditures may have contributed 
to the Iranian economy directly, through direct contributions to Gross Domestic 
Product, and indirectly, through spread or carry-over effects. The indirect 
contribution to growth embraces Hirschman type linkages and can broadly be 
considered as a sequence of multiplier accelerator mechanisms. Theoretically, 
indirect contributions (or spread effect) can contipue to accrue long after a specific 
military expenditure has occurred. (IS) The overall impact of military expenditures 
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on the Iranian economy is assumed to have had many determinants including 
technology, the extent to which investment opportunities generated were taken 
advantage of by domestic entrepreneurs, the ability to attract foreign factors, and so 
on. Obviously, neither the timing pattern exhibited by, nor the relative sizes of 
military expenditures direct and indirect contribution to growth need to be fixed and 
could conceivably have varied between subperiods. Provided that investment and 
demand opportunities generated by the growth of military expenditures are exploited 
and bottlenecks are not a constraint in growth, the model predicts that Iranian 
economic growth could be positively stimulated by military expenditures. 
To determine the direct impacts of military expenditures on the pre-
revolutionary Iranian economy, sectoral value-added over the period 1959-77 was 
regressed on military expenditure. To improve the specifications of the 
regression and obtain less biased estimates, non-oil income and gross domestic 
product were added as control variables (the results presented in Table 4 only 
include the most significant control variable). 
To test for structural changes associated with the 1973 oil price increases and 
the subsequent stepped-up level of defense expenditures, two dummy variables, 
DUMAX and DUMBX, were added to the regression equation. DUMAX was 
formed by multiplying real military expenditures by 0, 1959-1973 and 1, 
1974-77. DUMBX was formed by multiplying real military expenditures by 0, 
1959-74 and 1, 1975-77.<16> Clearly, a priori it is not possible to speculate 
whether increased oil revenues had an immediate impact (DUMAX) or a lagged 
(DUMBX) impact on the military expenditure-sectoral output relationship, 
hence both variables were independently introduced into the regression equation. 
The results with the dummy contributing most to the regression equation are 
presented in Table 4. 
The dummy variables test for any possible change in the impact of military 
expenditures on output associated with the oil boom. That is, a positive sign 
indicates that the post oil boom relationship was positive, i.e., increased military 
expenditures contributed to sectoral growth during this period, while a negative 
sign indicates that the stepped up expenditures out of the post-1973-74 oil boom 
preempted resources needed for the sector's expansion. 
Table -4- Iran: Direct Impact of Military Expenditure on Sectoral 
Output, 1959-1972 
\( ·011,tJut l'ri1·c) 
ln<lcpl·ndc:nt V ariablc 
Military Non-oil l Sucistks 
fqu .. tiou Sector Expenditure lnomu: GDP RHO ' f DW r-
----
ii) :\grkulrnrc 1.45 -0.12 -0.07 
(4.20) (-2.49) (41.27) 0.934 61.58 2.05 
(2) 1.82 -O.o7 U.32 
(5.07) (-3.52) (l.20) U.877 28.64 I.UH 
(3) M.rnula..:ruriug 0.05 0.50 -4.J.21 
(l.08) (2.15) (-0.77) tl.989 364.llJ I. 'JI 
(4) tl.27 0.(14 ..().52 
(l.44) (3.19) (-2.12) 0.994 731.61! 2.211 
(5) l'.1111.1runi.u1 0.70 -tl.06 0.23 
(3.59) (-2.43) (0.85) tl.1105 lh.52 I. •Jj 
. 
U.78. ..().03 tJ.39 (6) 
(3.62) (-2.58) (1.48) 0.749 11.98 f.78 
Oi W Jlcr aud Power 4UJ5 0.03 41.49 
H.44) (6.07) (-1. 93) 0.9'J5 757.58 2.W 
(ti) 4J.IJ5 0.01 -0. IO 
(l.04) (4.44) (-0.35) 0.983 245.28 2.05 
(9) Tr.de 0.79 4J.05 0.33 
\5.26) (-2.66) (1.22) 0.931 54.39 I.XO 
(10) 0.85 -0.03 0.49 
(5.10) (-2.71!) (I. 96) U.!1% 34.37 1.55 
(I I) l )wnaship ol l >wdlings 0.34 4J.02 0.17 
(3.47) (-1.32) (0.61) 0.914 52.76 1.97 l\l 
-.J 
Table 4 -Cont'd: Iran: Direct Impact of Military Expenditure on Sectoral I\) CX> 
Output, 1959-1972 
(< :1>1"1.1111 Price) 
lu<l.:p.:n,fcnt Variabl.: I Statistics 
·;,. Military Non-oil 
t,1u•tiu11 ~·uur Exp.:n<liturc hu:onu: GDP HHO ,,~ .. f J>W 
f'"'T:'f'"'•T'"r.,......·; , , -----
--
(12) 0.35 o.ot 0.19 
(3.24) (1.25) (0.67) 0.916 49.81 1. 'N 
\ 13) Tr J1hpnrc.11in11 Ju<l 
-0.07 0.04 0.02 
, \ :uuunuuil.·Jrion (-1.23) (4.42) (0.09) 0.976 162.97 I.HO 
il4) -0.1.19 0.02 -0.35 
(-2.24) (6.75) (-1.31) 0.914 600.32 2.07 
{15J u.11ki11i,: 0.30 0,02 0.82 
(3.60) (1.45) (4.92) U.857 24.(J'J 1.13 
(ii.) 0.35 0.01 0.80 
. (2.84) (1.81) (4.61) 0.k80 29.32 1.42 
(17) l'ri\Jtc Snvkcs 0.47 
-0.02 0.32 
(3.95) (-1.53) (1.3!!) 0.'J08 39.52 1.81 
(18) 0.85 -0.03 U.49 
(5.10) (-2.78) (l.97) 0.895 34.33 l.55 
(19) l'ubli, St·rvkc> 0.95 -0.lll fJ.ll<> 
(3.34) (-0.19) (J.08) 0.843 21.56 l.40 
<~.!.!L ..... 0.86 ... ::9,0,L . 0.-N 
(5.IOl (-2.78) (1.97) 0.8% 34.30 1.55 
Table 5- Iran: Direct Impact of Military Expenditure on Sectorai Cutput, 
(Constant Price) 1959-1977 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Military Gross 
Military Expenditure Non-oil Domestic' DU MAX DUMBX RHO r2 F DW 
Equation SCcto't Expenditure Lagged lnc~me Product 
,--- ---- --- --- ---~-- ---
(I) Agricultute 0.38 0.02 --0.28 --0.7f 
(5.73) (3.97) (-6.84) (-4.15~ 0.985 260.16 2.86 
(2) Manufacturing 0.24 ·0.04 --0.0 --0.66 
(11.64) (24.96) (--0:51) (-3.68) 0.998 2528.08 2.24 
(3) Construction 0.11 0.01 --0.05 -0.58 
(6.54) (6.12) (-4.31) (-2.94) 0.976 166.51 2.24 
(4) Water and Power 0.09 0.01 --0.03 --0.67 
(5.20) (4.20) (-4.33) (-3. 77) 0.997 1495.67 2.37 
(5) Trade 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.54 
(5.20) (11.88) \6.67) (-2.67) 0.998 2392:41 2.05 
(6) Ownership Dwellings 0.05 0.01 -0.02 --0,.67 
(2.13) (7.40) (-1.50) (-3. 76) 0.992 517.07 2:01 
<'71 Private Services 0.08 0.03 --0.06 -0.22 
(2.16) (5.52) (-2.73) (-0.94) 0.988 356.03 1.94 
0.19 0.04 --0.()3 --0.19 
(8) Public, Services (4.68) (11.23) (-1.21) (-0.80) 0.989 381.98 1.98 
0.02 0.07 0.65 




(10) Transportation 0.05 0.02 (6.,67) (-2.67) 0.998 2392.40 2.05 
and Communication (5.20) (11.88) 
NOTES: Economic dau: Bank Markazi Iran, Annual Report (various issues), Military data from Sockholm International Peace Research lnctltute, World Armaments and Disannamant, SIRPRI 
yearbook, various issues (Philadclp~: Taylor & Francis) contomt price military expenditure derived by deflationary current price military expenditures by the Bank Market _. 
I\) 
consumer price index. Estimates made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative istimation procedure to correct for serial corrcl.uion. co 
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The results (Table 5) indicate that: 
(1) In general, military expenditure had a positive direct impact on sectoral 
output growth; 
(2) Military expenditure had an immediate and positive direct impact on 
agriculture, construction, water and power, trade, ownership of dwell-
ings, private services and banking; 
(3) Military expenditures had a delayed but positive impact on manufactur-
ing, transportation and communication; 
(4) In most cases, the link between military expenditures and sectoral output 
was more direct than that between sectoral output and income (measured 
either as non-oil income or total GDP). 
As noted above, one of the main limitations of cross sectional analysis 1s us 
inability to identify the timing of impacts. In particular, the empirical economic 
development literature<17l has shown that many impacts of government 
expenditures demonstrate a distributed lag relationship, i.e., the impact of 
specific expenditures on incomes tends to decline over time in some type of decay 
scheme with the first year's impact the greatest, declining in subsequent years. 
Operationally, estimates utilizing Koy ck distributed lag schemes of the form 
yt = a + byt-1 + ex 
are used to measure both the direct and distributed impacts of certain 
expenditures (x) on output (y). 
The results (Table 6) for the period as a whole are as follows: 
(1) They confirm the distributed lag form of impact produced by military 
expenditures on most of the individual facets of the Iranian economy. 
(2) As with the direct impact estimates, the distributed lag formulations 
indicate the generally negative impacts on sectoral output of real goods 
produced by marginal increases in military expenditures after 1973-74. 
(3) In addition, the distributed lag formulations indicate that the output of 
services was stunted by marginal increases in military expenditures in the 
post-oil boom years. 
(4) In general, the incremental expenditures associated with oil price and 
revenue increases tended to have a negative impact on sectoral output of 
goods. 
(5) This negative impact was immediately felt (DUMAX) in agriculture, 
construction and private services, while it was felt after a lag (DUMBX) 
by water and power. 
Table 6 - Iran: Distributed Lagged Impact of Military Expenditures on 
Sectoral Output, 1959-1977 
(Cu11>ta11l l'ri(l·, billiou rials) 
Indcpcndcm Variables Statistics 
LJggcd 
Sector Military DU MAX DUMBX RHO r f I>W 
f.l(Uali<•ll Sn·1,>r Output Expenditures ; ~·; 
- ----- --- ·---- ---- ---
(I) Agrirnhurl· 0.28 11.45 41.30 4J.b4 
(1.72) (4.57) (-4.37) (-H'J) 0.971 us.•)<) 2.hl 
(2) ManutJnuriug 0.93 0.16 41.07 4J.52 
(10.41) (2.55) (-2.18) (-2.52) 0.998 1801.2 2.44 
(3) Cuu•ll uniun 0.66 (J.(J4 -0.38 
(3.93) (2.9J) (-1.71) 0.929 92.08 2.03 
(4) 0.41 0.16 4l.U9 -0.58 
(2.55) (3.87) (-3.03) (-2.95) 0.90(, 114.36 l.'>5 
(S) \V Jtn a11J Puw.:r 0.39 0.11 -0.114 4!.76 
(2.60) (5.48) (-5.58) (-4.'13) 0.999 1154.13 2.3'J 
(h) Trampo1 t.11iu11 Jlld 0.63 0.(18 
-0.49 
(~tJlllllilltlit.JCiuil (ld7) (5.61) (-2.3J) 0.9')'J 1286.()7 2.14 
(7) 0.62 0.11 -0.02 -0.60 
(7.84) (7.17) (-2.82) (-3. IU ) 0.997 132'J.\l2 2 .. H 
(Ii) Uauki11g 0.68 0.11 0.38 
(6.14) (3.98) (1.73) 0.984 437.66 2.12 
(9) 0.65 0.18 -U.lll> 0.02 
(8.28) (7.28) (-418) (0.08) U.9% 1119.36 I. 'JS 
(IO) TrJJi: 0.90 (J.04 ..(J.44 
(7.49) (I.%) (2.05) 0.982 380.23 2.08 ~ 
~ 
~ 
Table 6 -Cont'd: Iran: Distributed Lagged Impact of Military 
Expenditures on Sectoral Output, 1959-1977 
(Constant Price, billion rials) 
Independent Variables Statistics 
Lagged 
Sector .Military 
Equation Sector Output Expenditures DUMAX DUMBX RHO r2 F DW 
-
(11) 0.61 0.19 -0.10 -0.68 
(4.08) (4.08) (-3.53) (-3.85) 0.993 535.38 2.58 
(12) Ownership of Dwellings 0.70 0.08 -0.04 -0.54 
• (3.25) (2.05) (-2.10) (-2.66) 0.989 365.46 2.37 
(13) Private Services 0.95 0.02 -0.41 
(7.69) (1.47) (1.89) 0.985 467.48 2.08 
(14) 0.74 0.11 -0.06 -0.64 
(6.33) (3.60) (-3.23) (3.43) 0.993 604.22 2.64 
(15) Public Services 0.97 0.18 -0.11 -0.46 
(7.86) (2.02) (-2.12) (-2.13) 0.992 508.65 2.44 
NOTES: Sec Table 5 
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(6) Marginal increases in post-oil boom military expenditures with the 
exception of private services tended to have a positive impact on services, the 
impact was immediate in the case of trade, transportation and communi-
cations but lagged with regard to banking; 
(7) Marginal increases in military expenditures associated with the post-1973-
74 oil boom do not appear to have affected the overall sectoral relationship 
with regard to manufacturing, ownership of dwellings and public 
services. 
In general, therefore, the results obtained by regressing military expenditures 
on sectoral output indicate a generally positive relationship over the 1959-77 
period with evidence that the stepped-up levels of expenditure after 1973-74 
tending to reduce the strength of this impact on the production of tangible goods 
(but not services). 
To test this hypothesis that a generally favorable relationship existed between 
military expenditures and sectoral output, military expenditures were regressed 
on sectoral output for the post-oil boom years (1955-72). The results (Table 6) 
indicate that: 
(1) In general, a strong positive relationship existed between sectoral output 
and military expenditures over this period; 
(2) In only ~ne sector, transportation and communication was the impact of 
military expenditures statistically significant and negative. 
The distributed lag, direct impact and cross sectional analysis, therefore, 
provide a similar picture of the generally positive impacts of defense expenditures 
on Iran's economic growth. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, military expenditures in pre-revolutionary Iran seem to have aided 
economic growth by their net direct ar.d indirect contributions; ' e., the real 
economic costs : imposed by the military on the country appear to have been 
reduced to the extent that, in addition to the direct Keynesian demand-creating 
stimulus to income, the expenditures provided the training, construction, 
technological and industrial spillovers that contributed over time to economic 
growth. (IS) Both the cross section and time ser.ies analysis described above are 
consistent with the conclusion. 
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How long these effects would have continued to be present had the revolution 
not occurred is impossible to determine. However, given the apparent negative 
impacts of marginal increases in military expenditures after 1973-74, military 
expenditures if continued at their 1977 levels for several more years might have 
reached the point of negative net impact on overall growth. 
While there are grounds to question whether the country's defenst: expenditure 
did, in fact have an adverse affect. on growth, results of .the type obtamed in this 
study need to be carefully qualified. While the findings indicate that in all 
likelihood Iranian defense expenditures had a positive effect on growth as 
measured by gross domestic product, they do not show what rate of growth 
would have been achieved if billions of dollars had been spent directly on 
development programs rather than weapons. The fact the military expenditure 
increased human capital (low level skills mostly) only proves that not all military 
expenditure was wasted from a growth viewpoint. This is all that can be claimed 
statistically. 
On a more fundamental level, there needs to be a clear distinction made 
between economic growth and economic development. The results imply only 
that economic growth was not negatively affected by military expenditures. 
Development (as a more broadly based measure of the increase in living standards 
of the majority of the population) may well have been adversely affected by the 
levels of military expenditures undertaken, particularly after 1973. Manoucher 
Parvin and Amir Zamani (1977)<19> have convincingly demonstrated that there 
was a serious deterioration of the income distribution in Iran during this period: 
In 1352 (1972) the share of the lowest 60 percent of the urban households 
was almost equal to that of the top 5 percent of the urban families. While the 
lowest decile had an expenditure share of 1. 5 percent, the highest decile claimed 
about 36 percent of the total urban consumption expenditures. These figures 
clearly point t~ an even worse distribution of expenditures in urban areas 
compared to that of rural centers. But more importantly, they cast serious doubt 
on the nature of the whole last two decades. It seems that the beneficiary of the 
growth was merely a narrow layer of the population while bypassing the 
majority of the people. And indeed some segments of the population (about 40 
percent of the rural households) experienced impoverishment and deterioration 
in their standard of living (Parvin and Zamani 1979: 49-50). 
Clearly, for some countries, lower military expenditures lead to more 
resources being released which can be used for the improvement of the 
socio-economic conditions of the masses. The opposite is also true; there exists a 
negative tradeoff. However, for other countries, 1:he relationship could become 
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more complex. It is possible to have higher military expenditures and more social 
development, but growth may suffer. On the other hand, a militarized society 
such as pre-revolutionary Iran may suppress entitlements, helping growth in the 
process, but not achieving development for society at large. While beyond the 
scope of this paper, future research may find that this latter pattern completes our 
understanding of the impact of military expenditures on pre-revolutionary Iran. 
NOTES 
1. Quoted in Chubin (1978:268). See also the interviews granted by the Shah to 
Business Week (1975); Kahan International (1976) and The Middle East Economic 
Digest (1976). 
2. Cf. Rizvi (1979); McDermott and Whitley (1979); P. Z. and Silk (1979). A 
much more sophisticated version is also implicit in the writing of Halliday 
(1979a: chap,4; 1978; 1979b; 1979c). Also see, Walton (1980). 
3. An excellent survey of the literature of the defence growth debate is given in 
Chan (1985). 
4. Data are from U S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
(1974). See also Pryor (1978). 
5. Details of these sales are given in: U.S. Military Sales to Iran (1976) and 
United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, 
Present, and Future (1977). For an excellent overall assessment of American 
arms sales to Iran, see Gates (1980). 
6. For the details of the budgets and an interpretation of their implications, see 
Moran (1978/79). 
7. In actuality, however, Iran produced .only a very small proportion of the 
arms and ammunition that its military forces acquired. An excellent survey of 
the Iran defence industries is given in Schulz (1986). 
8. See also Benoit (1978). 
9. This is an extension of the original structuralist theory of development as 
outlined by Seers (1962). For the general problems of adjustment in 
developing countries see the survey by Nugent and Yotopoulos (1979). 
10. See Appendix for a description and source of each variable used in this paper. 
11. A description of cluster analysis is beyond the scope of this study. For an 
excellent discussion of the method, see Anderberg (1973). 
12. Seven countries (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Pakistan, 
and Zambia) were excluded from the analysis due to lack of data. 
13. The countries were also clustered using exclusively a broader based set of 
social indicators from the World Tables: 1976 (caloric intake, energy used per .:... 
capita, infant mortality, life expectancy, urbanization, percent of population 
in schools, percent of population in agriculture, and physicians per 1000 
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inhabitants). Again our regression results with two groups (higher and lower 
levels of development) on the •effect of defense on growth were statistically 
insignificant. 
14. For an interesting discussion of this problem see Dorfman (1972) and Benoit 
(1972). 
15. A similar method was applied by Metwally and Tamaschke (1980) to 
examine the impact of oil exports on economic growth in the Middle East. 
16. A similar structural change was modelled in El Mallakh and Kadhim (1974). 
17. Cf. Koyck (1954). A description of the interpretation of these estimates is 
given in Metwally and Tamaschke (1980). 
18. An interpretation originally hypothesized in Neuman (1978). 
19. Similar results are reported in Looney (1981). 
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APPENDIX 
Variables Used in the Analysis 
Variable 
( :ivilian GDP 











Private Consumption PCONS 
Jncrrn1rntal Capital- ICOR 
Output Ratio 
Import Elasticity IMPGDP 
Civilian Consumption ClVCON 








Government Consumption GCONS 
Government Expenditurc GOV EX 






Average Annual Growth, 1950-65 
Average percent of GDP, 1950-65 
Average percentage of Gross Do-
mestic lnvcstment 1960-73 
Average Annual Real Percent 
Growth, 1960-73 
A vcrage per<Tnt of l'Xporrs in cur-
rent price GDP, 1960-73 
Average percl"nt of private con-
sumption in rnrrent price (jlJl', 
1960-73 
Awrag<' investment to GDP ratio, 
196M-73 
Rate oi growth of current imports to 
currcnt GDP, 1%0-73 
Percent of general government total 
revenue 1965 
Current account as percentage of 
GDP, 1965 
1965 
A vcragc pcrc<'ntagc of imports 
(constant prices) minus export (Ca-
pacity to export to gross domestic 
income) 1960-73 
Chenery Capital Inflow (net import of goods 
and services) as percent of GDP, 
1%5 
Government consumption as per-
cent of GDP, 1%5 
World Total current government expendi-
Bank tures as a percent of GDP, 1%5 






Non-tax Revenue OR 
Government Savings GOVSAV 
Growth of Gross Domestic GDP 
Product 
Growth of Defense DEF 
Expenditures 
Growth of Imports IMP 
Growth of Investment INV 











Percent of general government total 
revenue, 1965 
As percent of Revenue, 1965 
Annual percentage change, 1950-65 
Average annual growth, 1960-73 
Average annual growth, 1950-65 
As a percent of GD!, 1960-73 
SOURCES: Emile Benoit, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1973); International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World 
Tables: 1976 (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
1978); Hollis Chenery and Moses Syrquin, Patterns of Development: 1950-70 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1975). 
OZET 
iran Devriminin kokenindeki nedenler heniiz tam bir ai;1khga kavu§mam1§tlr. 
Bir iddiaya gore savunma harcamalan ekonomi iizerinde gittiki;e artan olumsuz 
bir etki yaparak devrimle sonui;lanan sosyal gerginligin artmasma katk1da 
bulunmu§tUr. Bu makalenin amac1 bu tartl§mah konuyu aydmlatabilmek ii;in 
iran'daki savunma harcamalarmm degi§ik ekonomik sektorler iizerindeki etkileri-
nin say1sal bir analizini yapmaktlr. 
Savunma harcamalannm nicel ai;1dan incelenmesi bizi savunma sektoriine 
yaptlan tahsislerin dogrudan ve dolayh katktlanndan 6tiirii ekonomik biiyiimeyi 
olumlu bii;imde etkiledigi yoniinde bir sonuca gotiirmektedir. Ornegin askeri 
harcamalarm iilkeye yiikledigi reel ekonomik maliyetlerin geliri arttmc1 yonde 
talebi geni§leterek ve buna ek olarak egitim, in§aat. teknoloji ve endiistri alanmda 
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ekonomik d1~salhklar yaratarak zaman iizerinde ekonomik biiyiimeye katk1 
yapt1g1 anla~ilmaktad1r. Gerek kesit gerek zaman serisi bazmdaki veriler bu 
sonu~la bagda~maktadu. 
Eger devrim olmasayd1 bu etkiler ne kadar kahc1 olabilirdi sorusunu 
cevaplamak imkans1zd1r. Ancak 1973-74'den sonra savunma harcamalarmdaki 
marjinal art1~lann azalan katklSI goz oniinde tutuldugunda, yilhk harcamalar 
birka~ y1l daha 1977 diizeyinde kalsayd1 biiyiimeye olumsuz bir katk1 yapabilirdi 
~eklinde bir sonuca vanlabilir. 
Ekonomik biiyiime ve ekonomik geli~me kavramlarmm farkh oldugunu 
dii~iiniirsek yukanda vard1g1m1z sonu~lan bir ol~iide ihtiyatla kar§ilamak 
gerekebilir. Sonu~lar sadece ekonomik biiyiimenin savunma harcamalanndan 
olumsuz yonde etkilenmedigini gostermektedir. Geli§meyi daha geni§ anlamda 
niifus ~ogunlugunun ya§am standardmda bir art!§ olarak tammlarsak bunun 
ozellikle 1973'den sonraki savunma harcamalarmdan olumsuz yonde etkilendigi 
soylenebilir. 
A~1kt1r ki devrim oncesi iran gibi militarize olmu§ bir toplum ayncahklan yok 
ederek biiyiimeye yard1m edebilir fakat toplumun biiyiik kesimi a~1smdan 
geli§meyi ba§aramayabilir. Bu makalenin kapsam1 d1§mda kalmasma ragmen 
gelecekteki ara§tumalar bu tiir bir ili§kinin devrim oncesi iran'daki askeri 
harcamalann etkisini anlamam1za yard1mc1 olabilir. 
